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Rousso: Evidence

CALIFORNIA'S NEWSGATHERER'S. SHIELD:
INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATION MEANS
INADEQUATE PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION

California l is among the majority of states2 that have statutorily provided for a shield law protecting newsgatherers from
contempt for failure to disclose sources or unpublished information. In 1980, in an apparent attempt to add teeth to existing
law, California voters elected to amend the state constitution's
free speech clauses to include virtually the same shield law provisions codified in the Evidence Code.· The amendment passed
by an overwhelming majority:1
The shield law as written is straightforward: no finding of
contempt for failure to disclose a source, or to disclose unpublished information. 6 Unfortunately, there has been a lack of uni1. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988)
2. As of 1988, 26 states have enacted some sort of statutory protection for newsgatherers. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1983);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-85-510 (1987); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1974); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 para. 8-901-909 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns
Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21.100 (Baldwin 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
45:1451-1454 (West 1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (Supp.1988); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (Callaghan 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West 1988);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901-903 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144-147 (1987); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-2 (West Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT.
ANN. JUD. PAN. I, Rule 514C (1986); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (Conso!. Supp. 1988);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Page 1981); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2506 (West 1980); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1988); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-2-3 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §
24-11-208 (1980)
3. The clause originally read: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his
or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for abuse of the right. A law may not
restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
4. The original clause is now designated as subdivision (a); the 1980 amendment is
subdivision (b). CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
5. 73.3% of the voters were in favor of the proposition. March Fong Eu, Secretary of
State, Supplement to Statement of Vote, Primary Election June 3, 1980 at 8.
6.. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988); CAL. CONST. art. I § 2.
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formity in the judicial application of the shield laws to individual fact patterns. 7
This may be due, in part, to the following factors: the lack
of agreement as to the precise meaning of the California statutes, the absence of a detailed legislative history and the diverse
factual patterns where newsgatherer's shield has been at issue.
In addition, there is a lack of consensus as to the exact rights
which the Evidence Code and the constitution seek to protect.
Cases have, to a large extent, been decided in a piecemeal
fashion and appear result-oriented, based on the facts of the
case at hand. 8 Exceptions have been carved out on the basis of
the "type" of material sought to be protected. Outcomes are difficult to predict, at best. As a consequence, newsgatherers have
little guidance as to which materials may be safely thought of as
protected.
Thus, the shield law, even with its insertion into the constitution, is not facilitating the free flow of information to the public as the drafters ostensibly intended. Shield law continues to
be inconsistently applied and interpreted. This inconsistency
has led at least one commentator to speculate on whether the
constitutional amendment served any purpose at all. 9
The major cases of the past fifteen years aptly illustrate the
problems courts encounter in attempting to apply the newsgatherer's shield. Clearly, striking a proper balance between important constitutional rights, such as freedom of the press versus
the right to a fair trial, is difficult. In addition, courts have had
to grapple with a confusing array of "tests" to be applied in the
balancing process. Worse yet, there has been a tendency on the
part of the courts to apply tests created under one fact pattern
to other facts which are markedly dissimilar. While all of the
7. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 62, 70 and accompanying text.
9. See Note, The Newsgatherer's Shield - Why Waste Space in the California Constitution?, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 527 (1985). This note covers the judicial interpretation of the
newsgatherer's shield. The author concludes that narrow construction of the law does
little to shield reporters, and if the courts continue narrowly construing the law that
article I, section 2(b) of the California Constitution should be repealed "in the name of
trimming nonfunctional surplusage." Rather than "trimming" the constitution, this comment asserts that a clear statement is needed from the California Supreme Court Law.
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tests articulated over the past fifteen years may be valid, it is
not clear that they are interchangeable.
Whether the insertion of the newsgatherer's shield into the
state constitution in fact strengthened the shield is unclear. The
legislative history of the amendment provides little guidance as
to the drafters' intent. lo
Two recent California Court of Appeals decisions, New York
Times v. Santa Barbara l l and Delaney v. Superior Courtl2 came
to different conclusions about the scope of protection afforded
by the newsgatherer's shield. These two cases are currently on
review before the California Supreme Court. A third case, HalLissy v. Superior Court l3 may be an indication that the courts
are headed towards a more uniform interpretation of the shield
law, provided New York Times is affirmed by the supreme court.
This Comment will initially discuss the history of the shield
law in California and examine how it has been defined by the
courts in the leading cases. It will also discuss New York Times,
Delaney and Hallissy in terms of the courts' application of the
shield law to those cases. The analyses of New York Times and
Hallissy will be contrasted with that of Delaney. This Comment
will attempt to show how the New York TimeslHallissy analysis
could have been applied to the facts of Delaney and still have
yielded the same result.
Emphasis will be placed on problems facing the courts in
terms of statutory interpretation. The difficulty' in applying a
single test to diverse fact patterns will also be addressed. While
all of the tests that the courts have applied may have validity,
they are not interchangeable.
10. The Law Revision Commission was assigned the task of supervising the drafting
of the Evidence Code. In discussing the privilege, the Commission noted that there was
an "absence of reliable evidence in the form of legislative history or judicial interpretation." 6 Cal. L. Rev. Comm. Rep. Rec. and Studies 481, at 508. C{. KSDO v. Superior
Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375 at 383, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 at 215 (1982) ("The judicial history and case interpretation of the newsperson's privilege as embodied in Evidence Code
§ 1070 are just as tortuous and confused as its legislative origins.")
11. 202 Cal. App. 3d 503, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988), rev. granted, Oct. 27,
1988)(S006709).
12. 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1988), rev. granted, Oct. 27,
1988)(8006866).
13. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988).
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Recommendations will be made with respect to tests which
would aid the courts in their efforts to achieve a greater degree
of uniformity. Uniformity would lead to more predictable outcomes and further the goal of settling on a precise interpretation
of the shield law statutes.
This Comment proposes that despite the literal wording of
the shield law, newsgatherers have at least a qualified privilege
to not testify or disclose sources or unpublished information.
The Supreme Court of California should recognize this qualified
privilege in the interest of clarity and judicial economy.
The Legislature should excise a comment which immediately follows the statute." Whether California's shield law provides a "privilege" or "merely an immunity," or whether "they
are the same thing" is an issue which must be decided. In addition, a clear statement regarding the exact scope of protection
for "unpublished information" is necessary.
Finally, this Comment will argue that the more rational interpretation of the right conferred by the statute is one which
views it as a qualified privilege. The particular facts of a case, as
well as the newsgatherer's status as party or nonparty, should be
the basis of the proper test to be applied where the shield is at
issue.
If the reporter is a party, the case is likely a defamation
action. It is suggested that the tests appropriate to defamation

actions are not universally applicable. Where the reporter is not
a party, the next inquiry should be whether the action is civil or
criminal. In criminal actions, the burden is on the party seeking
disclosure to overcome the newsgatherer's qualified privilege.
The newsgatherer should not have the burden of showing that
the material for which protection is sought is "deserving" of
protection.
In a civil action, this comment suggests that the privilege
should be absolute, following the holding of New York Times. Io
14. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. The comment following the statute
states that the shield provides an immunity,. not a privilege. See also text accompanying
note 42.
15. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 510, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
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Labeling the right an absolute privilege in civil suits where the
reporter is a nonparty would hopefully allow the courts to speedily dispense with those cases in which plaintiffs or defendants
attempt to utilize newsgatherers as discovery resources.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NEWSGATHERER'S
SHIELD
A.

ORIGINAL LEGISLATION

California enacted statutory protection for newsgatherers in
1935, which provided: "A publisher, editor, reporter, or person

connected with or employed upon a newspaper cannot be adjudged in contempt by a court, the Legislature, or any administrative body, for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured for publication and published in anewspaper."16
Protection was initially limited to those associated with
newspapers. As time passed, news increasingly was transmitted
via other media, for example television and radio. The Legislature broadened the scope of protection accordingly; employees of
radio and television stations and wire services are now covered. 17

B.

EVIDENCE

CODE

SECTION

1070

AND

"IMMUNITY

FROM

CONTEMPT"

In 1965, Subdivision 5 of section 1881 of the Code of Civil
Procedure was transferred into the Evidence Code. IS In studying
the proposed transfer, the California Law Revision Commission
evaluated the issue of "[w]hether a newsman should have a privilege to prevent disclosure of his source of information."19 In its
report, the Commission voiced its concern regarding the problem
of "statutory deficiencies," and "ambiguity and definitions."2o
The Commission found the notion of a newsgatherer's privilege
"entirely alien to the common law," and also that "there is no
federal statute or independent body of federal law on this sub16.
CODE §
17.
18.
19.
20.

1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 532 § 1 pp. 1608·10 (West 1935) (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC.
1881) (repealed 1965).
Cal. S'tat. ch. 629, § 1 pp. 1797·98 (1961); see also note 9, at 536.
Former § 1881 of the Code of Civil Procedure became CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070.
6 Cal. L. Revision Comm. Rep. Rec. and Studies 481 (1964).
[d. at 485.
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ject."21 Finally, the Commission concluded that "there is no legally recognized newsman's privilege in the absence of statute."22
The Commission's report also discussed the issue of whether
any statutory privilege was desirable. 23 Policy arguments favoring 24 and opposing211 a statutory privilege were put forth. The
argument in favor was that without protection, news persons
would be unable to assure confidentiality to sources. 26 For example, if government employees seeking to expose corruption could
not be assured of confidentiality, they would be less likely to
come forward. Sources would dry up and the flow of information
to the public would be curtailed.
The opposing argument was that the public interest was
best served by full disclosure and rested upon "the established
duty to testify...axiomatic in our system of justice."27 The
thrust of this argument was, why should known evidence be kept
secret?
Two countervailing arguments-the need to keep open the
channels of information by assuring confidentiality versus "the
right to everyman's evidence"28-had been balanced by the majority of states, in practice at least. 29 The policy of "divulging
pertinent information to proper authorities"30 was weighed
against the value of legal protection for those who exposed
"matters which require public attention."31 Thus, the Commission concluded that newsmen should be afforded a privilege similar to that extended to "proper governmental authorities."32
21. [d. at 488.
22. [d. at 496.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 497.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 498.
[d. at 500.
31. [d.

32. Unfortunately, the report does not contain an example of what the Commission
considered a "privilege extended to a proJ)er governmental authority" to be. For that
matter, the report does not indicate who the Commission thought the "proper governmental authorities" were. [d.
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Having concluded that protection for newsgatherers was desirable, the Commission focused on defining the proper scope of
protection. Apparently alarmed by the wording of the statute,
the Commission noted that the statute appeared to grant "an
absolute privilege to newsmen,"33 which amounted to "a legislative determination that the public interest is best served by nondisclosure in every situation."M The Commission thus found
that a qualified privilege should exist and proposed a "discretionary" rule which would adequately protect any interest requiring legal sanctity while exposing those matters that demanded revelation. 311
A statutory rule of privilege was proffered, one which would
"protect the source of newsman's informants."36 A newsgatherer
could refuse to testify unless it was found that "(a) the source
had been disclosed previously, or (b) disclosure of the source is
required in the public interest."3?
The Commission then supplemented its proposed rule with
a comment subsequently adopted by the Assembly Committee
on the Judiciary, which states:
It should be noted that section 1070 provides an
immunity from being judged in contempt; it does
not create a privilege. Thus, the provision will not
prevent the use of the sanctions provided by the
discovery act when the newsman is a party to a
civil proceeding. In this sense, section 1070 retains existing law. s8

The Commission did not specify the meaning of the term
"immunity from contempt" with respect to non-party newsgatherers. The issue was created whether "immunity" provides
more, less, or the same protection that a privilege does. This issue has been hotly debated,39 and the "textual ambiguity"40 has
33. Jd. at 502.
34.Id.
35.Id.
36.Id.
37. Id. at 505.
38. 7 Cal. L. Revision Comm. Rep. Rec. and Studies 207 at 208 1965.
39. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). ("Labeling the protection an immunity rather than a privi-
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been noted as the shield's main flaw.
The Legislature, in adopting the comment, stated that a
privilege had not been created. It is unclear whether this issue
has been resolved. When the shield is referred to as a "privilege," is it just shorthand for referring to a newsgatherer's right
to refuse to disclose sources, or does a genuine legal privilege
exist? In other words, does forbidding the imposition of the
sanction of contempt amount to a privilege to not testify in
court for all newsgatherers? In addition, does the fact that sanctions "other than contempt" may be imposed on party newsgatherers mean that in other situations contempt may be Imposed on nonparty newsgatherers?
The "privilege or immunity" issue has meant that the protection afforded by the shield is reevaluated with every case.
The lack of harmony among the reported decisions suggests that
this approach is unsound. It is unclear why one standard regarding the scope of protection has not been enunciated. A clear
statement regarding the exact breadth of the protection afforded
by the shield is necessary. Such a statement should consider the
proper scope of protection for the newsgatherer as party and as
nonparty; and also whether the litigation is civil or criminal. The
California Supreme Court should address the question of
whether the insertion of the newsgatherer's shield into the State
constitution elevated its scope of protection. It should also clarify the scope of protection for unpublished information.
Since 1965, three amendments have been made to Evidence
Code section 1070 substantially broadening the scope of its protection. u First, protection was extended to ex-newspersons.'2
Next, the statute was broadened to apply to other governmental
entities possessing subpoena power, such as legislatures and adlege is of no importance.") But cf. Delaney v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019,
1025 n.8, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60, 64 n.8 (1988) ("The shield law has always been limited in
scope. It has never contained a privilege against disclosure. Rather, it merely provides
'an immunity' from being adjudged in contempt.") Contra, New York Times v. Superior
Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 508, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429 (1988) (citing HOGAN, MODERN
CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY, (3d ed. 1981) § 11.27 p. 350) ("In cases where the newsgatherer is
not a party, this 'immunity' is the functional equivalent of a privilege.")
40. 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 527 at 538 (1985).
41.. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988).
42. 1972 Cal. Stat. ch. 1717, § 1 pp. 3658.
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ministrative bodies. 43 Then, in order to ensure that all members
of the media were protected,those newspersons not afforded protection by the literal wording of the statute were granted protection." Finally, the category of unpublished information, such as
notes and outtakes was included. 411 This includes information
not disseminated, regardless of whether related information has
been disseminated. 48
Today, the shield law protects virtually all those engaged in
newsgathering. The threshold requirement is that the material
must have been obtained during the course of newsgathering for
communication to the public. 47 The fact that information related
to the protected material may have been published should not
lessen the scope of protection afforded. In addition, whether the
material is protected should not depend on its contents, although the courts are still debating this point.4 8
C.

SHIELD LAW AND THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION

In 1980, the free speech clause of the state constitution was
amended to include language virtually identical to that found in
Evidence Code section 1070,49 The amendment may have been
motivated in part by two cases, Farr v. Superior Court 50 and
Rosato v. Superior Court,51 which did not apply the shield.
In Farr, a reporter covering the trial of Charles Manson and
two codefendants was given a copy of the sealed statement of a
witness containing testimony about the planning of other
murders. 52 Farr wrote an article based on this information. 58
43. 1974 Cal. Stat., ch. 1323 § 1 pp. 2877.
44. [d.

45. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(c) (West Supp. 1988).
46. The text concludes by including in its definition of "unpublished information"
the following, "[w)hether or not published information based upon or related to such
material has been disseminated." [d.
47. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(a) (West Supp. 1988).
48. Delaney v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019 at 1030, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60 at
67 ("Unpublished information provisions do not apply to compelled eyewitness testimony concerning a public event.") See infra text accompanying note 150.
49. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
50.. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971),
51.. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr.427 (1975).
52. Farr, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
53. [d. at 65, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
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The court was determined to identify the party who had given
the information to Farr since the source had to have been one of
the attorneys of record.~·
Farr was cited for contempt after refusing to disclose the
source of the sealed statement.1i 1i In upholding the contempt citation, the court of appeals found that "in the matter at bench
there is an undeniable need for disclosure if the court is not to
be thwarted in its effort to enforce its order against pretrial publicity."lis Control over the proceedings and the officers of the
court were found to be paramount concerns. ~7
In Rosato, a grand jury transcript indicting various individuals was ordered sealed until the conclusion of all of the defendants' trials.1i8 Thereafter, quotations from the transcript appeared in the Fresno Bee, under Rosato's byline. Rosato, like
Farr, refused to disclose from whom he had received the transcript. ~9
The Court of Appeals upheld Rosato's citation of contempt. so In so holding, the court found that in the interest of
maintaining the free flow of information to the public as intended by the Legislature, a "broad, rather than narrow construction" of the statute was appropriate. s1 There were, however,
certain "limitations on the exercise of the privilege," and therefore the shield law was not applicable in Rosato's case. S2
In explaining why Rosato was not to be protected by the
shield, the court cited Branzburg v. Hayes S3 and noted that the
54. Id. at 66, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
55.Id.
56. Id. at 73, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350.
57. The court concluded that after balancing "[t)he interest to be served by disclosure of source against its potential inhibition upon the free flow of information" that Farr
had no privilege to refuse to answer questions put to him in the trial court. Id.
58. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434 (1975).
59.Id.
60. Id. at 231, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
61. Id. at 219, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
62. Although the court conceded that § 1070 did arguably provide newsgatherers
with a privilege against being held in contempt, the court stated that the party claiming
the privilege had the burden of showing that the testimony "would lead to a source." [d.
at 218, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 445. The court characterized this burden to be "not a heavy
one." Id.
63. 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). (By a 5-4 vote, the court found that newsgatherers did
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First Amendment does not confer "a license on either the reporter or his sources to violate valid criminal laws. "64 Like the
court in Farr, the Rosato court found a limitation on the First
Amendment arising from "the inherent power of the judiciary as
a separate and coequal branch of our tripartite governmental
structure to control its own officers and proceedings."611
After the decisions in Farr and Rosato, the Legislature initiated legislation to amend the constitution to include a provision
for the protection of newsgatherers. 66 The legislative intent is
unclear. Since there was already a statutory source of protection
for news gatherers in Evidence Code section 1070, the Legislature
may have believed that inserting a similar provision into the
state constitution would somehow fortify the scope of its protection. Presumably, the shield would then be less susceptible to
judicial tampering.
The fact that the amendment is worded in virtually the
same fashion as the Evidence Code67 may provide an argument
that the intent was to elevate the shield simply by virtue of its
insertion into the state constitution. On the other hand, had the
amendment been worded differently the "elevation" might have
been more clear. Significantly, the "immunity, not privilege"
comment following the statute was not included. 68 However, had
the constitutional amendment stated that news gatherers have a
privilege to not testify, all of the speculation concerning the effect of constitutionalization would be unnecessary. As a result,
at least one commentator has concluded that the amendment
did little or nothing to bolster Evidence Code Section 1070. 69
not have a constitutional privilege to refuse to testify at state or federal grand jury hearings, and encouraged state legislatures to provide for their own newsgatherer shields).
64. Rosato, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 219, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
65.Id.
66. There are three ways in which the state constitution may be amended: by initiative; by legislative proposal; and by constitutional convention. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII §§
1-4.
67. The only difference in the wording of the two statutes is that where the Evidence Code reads "cannot" be adjudged in contempt, the constitutional clause reads
"shall not" be adjudged in contempt. There is no support for the proposition that this
difference was intended to be of any significance.
68. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 Comment-Assembly Committee on the Judiciary. (West
Supp. 1988).
69. See supra note 9, at 546.
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III. PRIVILEGE OR IMMUNITY?

A. KSDO

V. SUPERIOR COURT

KSDO v. Superior Court70 involved a libel action against a
radio station and a news reporter. The case was based on a news
broadcast implicating members of a southern California police
department in a drug smuggling operation. 71 In KSDO, the court
commented that while "the term 'shield law' conjures up visions
of broad protection and sweeping privilege, [the law] is unique
in that it affords only limited protection." 72
The court found that the inclusion of the law in the state
constitution did little to broaden its scope of protection73 and
thus declared, "[i]n reality, California Constitution article I section 2 provides no more of a privilege than did section 1070 of
the Evidence Code."74 In the court's view, the shield law provided "[a]n immunity from contempt, not a privilege against
disclosure.7Ii A discussion of the effects of constitutionalization
of that immunity is not necessary to resolution of the case
before us. "78
The KSDO court shared the fears of the Law Revision Commission against "creating a privilege."77 Noting the Commission's comment78 that a privilege had not been created, the court
70. 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982).
71. Id. at 378, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
72. The court found that there was a "rather basic distinction" between the terms
'immunity' and 'privilege.' Id. This distinction, according to the court, "has been misstated and apparently misunderstood by members of the news media and our courts as
well." Id. at 379-80, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213. The court did not, however, elaborate what
the "basic distinction" to be made was. Instead, it was merely noted that in the jurisdictions which did provide newsgatherers with a privilege, the word "privilege" was used in
the text of the statute. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
73. In its recounting of the history of the shield law, the court may have indicated
its opinion of the shield when it described the insertion of the statute into the constitution as a "curious step" in the evolution of the law. Id. at 381, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
74. Id. at 381-82, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
75. Id. at 383, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
76.Id.
77. The court found that although the Evidence Code and constitution did not protect the petitioner, the first amendment did. Id. at 384, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217. The court
went on to outline the considerations which would be used in balancing "freedom of the
press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal
conduct." Id.
78. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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stated that in other states where a privilege had been created,
the word "privilege" was a part of the text of the statute. 7S
Emphasizing that the case was a libel action in which the
reporter was a party, the KSDO court stated that "the shield
law does not apply since petitioner has not been threatened with
or cited for contempt."so However, the court did not elaborate
on its reasons for finding that the accusation of libel renders a
reporter ineligible for protection by the shield.
Implicitly, the court found that libel actions were unique
situations and to uphold the shield would have unfairly
prejudiced the plaintiff. This argument was grounded in the assumption that the material for which the privilege had been
claimed contained "vital information directly related to the
plaintiff's claim."sl Citing Branzburg S2 and Garland v. Torre,S3
an earlier federal case, the KSDO court found that in libel cases,
"the truth or falsity of the material published is the essential
issue [and] therefore production of the reporter's notes for identification of his source can be essential to the plaintiff's successful prosecution. "S4
Clearly, a reporter's notes would provide plaintiffs in libel
actions with evidence in support of their claims that the reporter's state of mind was such that "actual malice"slI could be
79. 136 Cal. App. 3d at 383 nA, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216 nA. (The court referred to a
New Jersey statute construed in Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 44 A.2d
376, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982) which states in essence that newsgatherers have a
privilege to refuse to disclose sources or unpublished information).
80. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 384, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
81. The court discussed the issue of whether the identity of the sources for whom
protection was sought went to the "heart of the claim" and found that it did not, because
the reporters had previously revealed their names. [d. The court also found that the
status of the reporter as a party to the litigation would tip the scales "[i)n favor of dis·
closure of the material in question." [d. at 386,186 Cal. Rptr. at 217. However, since the
information was available to the plaintiff from sources other than those the reporter
sought to protect, the court held that the "[q)ualified privilege under the First Amendment protected KSDO from having to reveal the reporter's notes." [d.
82. 408 U.S. 665.
83. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) (libel
action brought by actress Judy Garland after an unflattering item had appeared in a
local gossip column regarding Garland's weight).
84. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
85. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) ("actual malice" defined as publication of false or defamatory material "with knowlege that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false").
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inferred by publication. The KSDO court neglected, however, to
elaborate as to how the interest of aiding a libel plaintiff was to
be balanced against the interest of protecting confidential
sources. It is not clear why aiding a libel plaintiff validates limiting the scope of protection afforded by the shield law.
The issue is best framed in terms of the public interest.
While aiding a libel plaintiff in the prosecution of a claim is of
some interest to the public, is not a greater interest served by
policies which increase, rather than impede, the flow of information to the public?
The KSDO court concluded that in determining the scope
of protection, a balancing approach was appropriate, utilizing
the following factors: 1) the nature of the proceeding; 2) the status of the newsperson as party or nonparty; 3) alternative
sources of information; and 4) the relationship of the information to the "heart of the claim."8s
Ostensibly this approach is applicable to all shield law
cases. However, a better approach would first ask whether the
reporter was a party. If not, the other KSDO factors might not
be as appropriate to consider as other factors, such as whether
the proceeding was civil or criminal. Significantly, the court in
KSDO concluded that the shield law provided no protection for
the newsgatherers; instead, they were protected by virtue of a
"[q]ualified privilege under the First Amendment."87
The finding of the court was laudable in the sense that the
reporter was not cited for contempt and did not have to reveal
his source. However, since the court did not base its finding of
privilege on the provisions of the shield, the finding is of little
precedential value in determining the shield's scope of protection. In addition, the court chose not to discuss the effect of inserting the shield law provisions into the state constitution. 88
Thus, the KSDO holding provides little guidance on the question of whether the insertion of the shield into the constitution
did in fact elevate its protection. It should also be noted that the
test articulated in KSDO was grounded in a libel action. This
86. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
87. [d. at 386, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
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test is of limited value in evaluating cases where the reporter is
not a party to the action. In those cases, contempt is generally
the only sanction available. And, since the express terms of the
statute preclude the finding of contempt, a privilege in effect exists. The California Supreme Court addressed this issue two
years later in Mitchell v. Superior Court.89
Mitchell, another libel case, involved a suit by the Synanon
organization against The Reader's Digest, an author who had
written about Synanon for the magazine, and David and Cathy
Mitchell, who had written a series of articles criticizing the organization in their newspaper, The Point Reyes Light. 90 Synanon sought, through discovery, to obtain nearly all documents in
the Mitchells' possession relating to the organization. 91 Synanon
asserted that the documents would support its claim that damaging evidence had been emphasized while more favorable evidence had been suppressed. 92
,

The California Supreme Court did not refer to the shield
law as providing a privilege. The court did, however, note that
"since contempt is generally the only effective remedy against a
nonparty witness [and] the shield law prohibit[s] a finding of
contempt, a privilege of nondisclosure had in fact been
created."93
The Mitchell court then added a qualification which has
been widely quoted in succeeding years. "A party to civillitigation who disobeys an order to disclose evidence. . .may be subject to a variety of other sanctions, including the entry of judgment against him."94 The problem is that later courts have
quoted the passage in order to bolster findings that the reporter
was not protected by the shield law-regardless of whether the
reporter was a party to the action. 95 A close reading of Mitchell,
89. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 690 P.2d 625 (1984).
90.Id.
9!. Id. at 273, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 154, 690 P.2d at 627.
92. In its complaint, Synanon alleged that the Mitchells "conspired and acted in
concert with each other to write, edit and publish to and among each other and to the
readers of the article the false, malicious and defamatory words and language contained
therein." Id. at 273, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 154, 690 P.2d at 627.
93. Id. at 274, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155, 690 P.2d at 628.
94. Id. (emphasis in original).
95. See Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1045, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635,
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however, leads to the conclusion that libel actions are unique.
The tests which are useful in evaluating shield law cases based
on libel are not universally applicable.
The Mitchell court found that the goal of protecting confidential sources and information could not be ignored. 96 A test
was suggested which, in civil cases, would "weigh the assorted
interests in light of the facts of the case before [the court]."97
The court held that a "qualified privilege" existed vis-a-vis compelled disclosure, depending on the facts of the particular case. 98
According to the Mitchell court, the test for determining
the scope of the privilege has four factors: 1) whether the reporter was a party; 2) the relevance of the information sought to
the plaintiff's cause of action; 3) whether the plaintiff had exhausted all alternative sources of the information; and 4) the importance of protecting confidentiality in the case at hand. 99
The Mitchell test may prove to be the most effective in
evaluating claims of newsgatherer's privilege in libel actions.
However, the court did not provide a solution when the answer
to the first question was negative. In other words, what is the
scope of the privilege where the newsgatherer is a nonparty? Until recently, little attention has been paid to this question. A
clear statement by the California Supreme Court about the
scope of protection for nonparty news gatherers in both civil and
criminal actions is needed. It may be, as was suggested by the
court in New York Times 100 that in civil actions, where the newsperson is a nonparty, the Mitchell balancing factors are not
necessary.
639 (1988); Delaney v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 1025 n.8, 249 Cal. Rptr. 60,
64 n.8 (1988); see also WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 1291 at 1234 (3d ed. 1986).
96. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 276, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 156, 690 P. 2d at 629 ("We cannot
ignore or subordinate the First Amendment values furthered by the protection of confidential sources and information; at the same time, we must recognize the parallel importance of the policy of favoring full disclosure of relevant evidence.")
97. [d.
98. [d.
99. [d. at 279-83, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159-61, 690 P. 2d at 632-34.
100. 202 Cal. App. 3d at 509, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
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HAMMARLEY V. SUPERIOR COURT

Hammarley v. Superior Court lOl illustrates the point that
the nature of the litigation-civil or criminal-and the status of
the newsgatherer-party or nonparty-is highly relevant to the
type of analysis utilized in shield law cases. John Hammarley, a
reporter for the Sacramento Union, wrote three articles in 1979
about the "Mexican Mafia. II102 The articles contained statements
implicating certain "mafia members" in a murder. lOS Hammarley's source was a former "member" who had "defected" and
was a witness for the prosecution.l04
After receipt of subpoena as a witness in the criminal action, Hammarley moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds
that it sought production of "unpublished information" protected by Evidence Code section 1070. 105 The superior court refused to quash the subpoena on the grounds that the "unpublished information" provision applied only to material leading to
sources, not to unpublished information in genera1. 106 Hammarley was cited for contempt, which was stayed pending
appea1. 107
The Hammarley opinion is noteworthy in at least two respects. First, the opinion established the principle that the "unpublished information" section of the Evidence Code was not
limited to source disclosure. "[T]he statutory privilege protecting unpublished information is not limited to material which
might [lead to source disclosure] but encompasses all information... not disseminated to the public. II108
Second, the Hammarley test is well suited to the situation
where the person claiming the privilege is a nonparty, especially
where the party seeking disclosure is a criminal defendant.
101. 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979).
102. [d. at 392, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
103. [d. at 393, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

[d.

See text accompanying notes 10, 48.
Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 394, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
[d. at 395, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
[d. at 398, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 613. The court characterized this view as an "expansive interpretation" in finding that protection was not limited to source disclosure.
[d. at 397, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
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Hammarley set out a three-part test. First, the party seeking disclosure must show that the information is "relevant and
necessary to his case."109 Next, the party must show that the
information is not available from a source "less intrusive on the
privilege."llo Finally, he must show that the evidence sought
might reasonably result in his exoneration. l l l
The test is suitable for evaluating claims of privilege where
the newsgatherer is not a party, as it provides for a balancing
between the interest of a free press with the right to a fair trial.
The problem is that this test seems best suited to criminal litigation. It is not clear that it is applicable in the situation of civil
litigation where the reporter is not a party.
The better approach would be to apply the Mitchell test in
the particularized situation of libel and the Hammarley test in
criminal cases where the reporter is not a party. In civil cases
where the reporter is a nonparty, there does not appear to be a
compelling state interest in obtaining the newsgatherer's testimony. In that situation, no "test" is necessary and there is an
absolute privilege to not testify. If an absolute privilege is not
found desireable, there should be at least a qualified privilege.
The qualified privilege would require a strong showing on the
part of the party seeking disclosure before disclosure would be
compelled.

IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

New York Times v. Superior Court1l2 and Hallissy v. Superior Court 1l3 aptly illustrate the benefit which would be obtained
by clarifying the scope of protection for nonparty newsgatherers.
The approach taken by the courts in those two cases suggest
that a rigorous classification scheme might simplify analysis of
shield law cases, as well as to protect the interests of newspersons adequately.
109. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing People v. Borunda, 11 Cal. 3d 523, 527, 113 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827, 522
P. 2d 1, 3 (1974)).
112. 202 Cal. App. 3d 503, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988).
113. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988).
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The balance of this Comment suggests a proper scheme of classification of shield law cases which would aid the courts in evaluating claims of newsgatherer's privilege where the reporter is not
a party. This Comment also suggests that if the California Supreme Court affirms New York Times, it may be considered
proof that the insertion of section 1070 into the constitution did
elevate its scope of protection.
A.

THE HALLISSY CASE

Hallissy arose after reporter Erin Hallissy interviewed John
Sapp 114 in jail as he was awaiting trial. Sapp had been charged
with three counts of murder, plus multiple murder, rendering
him eligible to receive the death penalty.llli Hallissy wrote an
article published in the Contra Costa Times entitled "I Killed
Many for Pay." The prosecutor then amended the complaint to
include murder for financial gain.1I6

Hallissy was subpoenaed by the defendant to appear at the
preliminary examination with the notes of her interview.ll7 She
successfully quashed the subpoena on the grounds that the unpublished material was protected by the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution and by article 1, section 2b of the California Constitution.1I8
Sapp filed a motion in accordance with the Penal Code 119
which stated, in essence, that Hallissy was a witness in his behalf whom he had a right to call. 120 The defense contended that
Sapp's statements to Hallissy contradicted previous statements,
and this contradiction cast doubt on his veracity. 121 Casting
doubt on his veracity, in turn, weakened the reliability of earlier
statements confessing to the murders.122
114. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635.
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (West 1988).
116. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
117. [d.
118. [d.
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 995 (West 1985).
120. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. 636. (The appellate court
stated that "one of several contentions raised was that the order quashing the subpoena
denied Sapp his substantial right to call a witness in his behalf.")
121. [d.
122. Defendant contended that he had "confessed all over the place" and therefore
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At the hearing, the superior court held it should balance the
detriment to the reporter caused by forced disclosure with the
harm the defendant would suffer were he not allowed to obtain
the information. 12s The superior court ruled in Sapp's favor on
the grounds that the criminal defendant's rights outweighed the
value of protecting a newsgatherer. l24 The basis of the holding,
however, was not that Sapp had made a showing that he would
be denied his right to a fair trial; the court instead based its
ruling on the fact that the party seeking disclosure was the
source himself. "We have no confidential sources. We have no
witnesses and names being sought to be protected."1211
The fact that the party seeking disclosure was the source
himself was novel. But this did not justify neglect of the proper
evaluation, which was whether the defendant had met the burden of defeating a claim of privilege under the shield law. The
Evidence Code and the state constitution clearly protect against
disclosure of sources and "unpublished information" regardless
of whether such information has been disseminated to the public. 12s The code and the constitution do not state that the identity of the source is a relevant consideration.
Hallissy was held in contempt by the superior court for refusing to testify and the court of appeals granted review. The
appellate court quoted Mitchell for the proposition that the
shield law did not itself preclude the imposition of sanctions
other than contempt; but noted that Mitchell had also found
that contempt was "generally the only effective remedy against a
nonparty witness."127 The Hallissy court found that the shield
law "confers the absolute immunity it appears to offer only
his confessions were unreliable. See Petitioner's Request for Stay, Petition for Writ of
Mandate at 35.
123. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1041, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636 "Although the newspapers are entitled to the protection of their sources and the confidentiality of information,
this is a case that doesn't involve that in any way." This typifies the tendency of some
courts to diminish the scope of protection for "unpublished information."
124. [d.
125. The lower court had apparently presumed that since the "source" himself was
also the party seeking disclosure, no confidentiality was at stake.
126. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988).
127. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1042, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 636. The court cited
Mitchell for the proposition that "compelled disclosure might be appropriate in those
cases in which are parties." 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 635, citing
Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 690 p.2d 625.
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when a nonparty witness refuses to disclose the covered
information. "128
The court in Hallissy did not clarify what was meant by the
term "absolute immunity." It did not hold, for example, that
"absolute immunity" provides newsgatherers with more protection than "immunity" alone. Nor did the court discuss the difference, if any, between "privilege" and "absolute immunity."
However, the approach the court utilized could have been
grounded in the assumption that at least a qualified privilege for
newsgatherers exists. 129 The burden of overcoming the qualified
privilege is on the party seeking disclosure, as had been found in
Hammarley.lSO Although it was compelling in Hallissy that the
source himself was the party seeking disclosure, nonetheless he
still had to meet the burden of overcoming the news gatherer's
privilege.
That burden, according to the Hallissy court, was meeting
Hammarley's three part test. lSl The defendant had to show that
the information was relevant and necessary to the case; that it
was not available from a source "less intrusive on the privilege;"
and that if the information was produced it might reasonably
lead to his exoneration. ls2 In defendant Sapp's case, the court
found that only one of the three requirements had been close to
being met: that of relevancy.lSS
Even though the court described the newsgatherer's shield
as an "absolute immunity" and not as a "privilege," it nevertheless treated the reporter as though she had at least a qualified
privilege. 1M The court's analysis is similar to that used in evaluating claims of privilege-focusing on the burden to be met by
128. [d. at 1045, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39.
129. See id. at 1045-1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639, (citing Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d

at 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 614) (the court discussed what a party "faced with a claim of
privilege" had to show in order to overcome that privilege).
130. Hallissy, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1046, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
131. [d.
132. [d.
133. [d. (The court found that Sapp "arguably [approached] an adequate showing of

relevancy: he wishes to attack his own credibility by using inconsistent statements that
he may have made to the reporter during the interview.")
134. [d. (The court viewed the shield as providing a qualified privilege by its use of
the Hammarley test. which outlined the task necessary to overcome a qualified
privilege).
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the party seeking to overcome the privilege. 1811
Although the court might easily have overcome Hallissy's
claim of privilege by pointing out that there was no confidential
source being protected, as had the lower court,186 it did not. The
Hallissy court focused on what was necessary to defeat a claim
of privilege. Hallissy may be viewd as a reaffirmation of Hammar ley in the sense that the shield protects against disclosure of
sources and against disclosure of unpublished information, regardless of who the source is.
If this approach is uniformly adopted, a higher degree of
consistency and predictability might result. The Hallissy opinion can be viewed as a tacit acknowledgement that the scope of
the shield is broad and not to be narrowly applied. If the qualified privilege is to be overcome, it must not be on the basis of
the contents of the material for which protection is sought, but
instead because the party seeking disclosure has made a sufficient showing of the material's releveance and necessity to the
case.

B.

NEW

YORK

TIMES:

ABSOLUTE

PRIVILEGE

FOR

NONPARTY

NEWS GATHERERS

Close on the heels of Hallissy came New York Times v. Superior Court. 18? This case contains the the clearest, most
sweepng affirmation of an absolute privilege for nonparty newsgatherers in civil actions.
In New York Times, a reporter working for the Santa Barbara News-Press l88 witnessed an auto accident and took photos
at the accident scene. 18B A personal injury suit and products liability action was brought against Volkswagen of America, Inc. 140
135. The court's opinion consistently refers to what Sapp needed to prove to overcome the privilege. The opinion discusses the "nature" of the privilege in a cursory fashion, noting but briefly its origins. This approach is sound in the sense that it may be
viewed as a tacit acknowledgement of at least a qualified privilege, despite calling it an
"immunity."
136. See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
137. 202 Cal. App. 3d 503, 248 Cal. Rptr. 426.
138. The Santa Barbara News-Press is owned by the New York Times.
139. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 505, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
140. [d. at 505, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
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Volkswagen sought production of "all photographs, negatives,
notes and letters" in the possession of the News-Press to compare with photos taken by the California Highway Patrol. UI
News-Press contended that the photos were of little additional value and refused to produce them. u2 Volkswagen moved
to compel production of the photographs. us Despite NewsPress' contention that the photos were "absolutely priviliged"
under both the Evidence Code and the state constitution, the
superior court found that only a qualified privilege existed. 144
The lower court attempted to view the photos in camera to determine whether Volkswagen's right to discovery outweighed the
qualified privilege. 146 News-Press sought releif by way of extraordinary writ and a stay of the court's order.ue

The court of appeals noted that the lower court had viewed
the issue as "a tempest in a teapot," as confidential sources were
not involved. 147 The lower court in New York Times had attempted to analyze the issue in terms of the type of material for
which protection was being sought,U8 just as the court in Hallissy had fucused on the fact that the party seeking disclosure
was the source himself.
Volkswagen contended that only a qualified privilege existed which was "outweighed by a public policy favoring disclosure of relevant evidence. "149 Apparently recognizing that helping
141. [d.
142. [d.
143. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 505, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
144. [d.
145. [d.
146. [d.
147. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 507,248 Cal. Rptr. at 428. The court said
that it would not speculate on the manner in which the News-Press ran its paper. "We

assume, however, that it is not with the same insouciance expressed by Charles Foster
Kane." The court was referring to the film "Citizen Kane," where Kane states: "I don't
know how to run a newspaper, Mr. Thatcher. I just try everything that works." (Citizen
Kane, 1949).
148. The unpublished photos which Volkswagen sought were of little value in a newsmaking sense and did not concern a confidential source; the appellate court noted that
the trial judge had concluded that the photos "would undoubtedly rest in some dusty
repository until they are put in the wastebasket." 202 Cal. App. 3d at 507, 248 Cal. Rptr.
at 428. While it is tempting to disregard such unimportant information, it is these innocent exceptions which may lead to later inconsistencies or more exceptions.
149. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 507, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
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an auto manufacturer defend a products liability action was of
limted value to the public, the court of appeals found that Volkswagen's construction of the law "would substantially impair a
newsgatherer's access to information. "1110
The New York Times court apparently recognized the danger of overapplication of the "policy of disclosure" argument. 1111
It is true that public policy favors that which encourages rather
than impedes the free flow of information. However, the principle behind the policy should not be overlooked. The "policy of
disclosure" is based on the public's need to be informed about
matters of general import; for example the exposure of corruption. The "policy of disclosure" argument should not be emphasized to the point where newsgatherers, who are the means by
which the public receives its information, unwittingly and unwillingly become vast and potent resources of discovery. This is
inconsistent with the basic notion of a free and unfettered press.
After noting briefly that the Evidence Code and state constitution did not literally create a privilege, the New York Times
court found no difference between the terms "immunity" and
"privilege."11l2 The court eloquently and emphatically discounted
any difference in meaning. "But, as a rose is a rose by any other
name, so too is a privilege. Nonparty newsgatherers receive absolute protection against compelled disclosure. IIlIiS
The court conceded that a qualified privilege may exist in
criminal matters and in those situations "a balancing of competing interests may be appropriate. "1114 The court correctly pointed
out however, that the scope of protection was not limited to
source disclosure. lGII
The New York Times court also noted that the Mitchell
150. [d.
151. It is conceded that at least where the rights of a criminal defendant are at
stake, there is a duty on the part of citizens to testify. See supra accompanying notes 2729.
152. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 508, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
153. [d.
154. [d.
155. "The Constitution and the statute recognize that a newsgatherer's information
must be protected whether or not that information comes from a confidential source."
[d. at 510, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
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balancing of interest test 1ll8 had been premised on a libel action
and hence was not applicable in all cases involving the shield
law.1G7 Citing Playboy Enterprises v. Superior Court,1G8 the
court stated that in the Playboy case, also a civil action, discovery had been sought by a nonparty to the action. 1I19 The court
construed Playboy as having found the shield law to be paramount as compared to a civil litigant's right to discovery.18o The
New York Times court pointed out, however, that the Playboy
court had "engendered confusion by pausing to consider a
threshold question" of whether to balance competing interests of
news gatherers with civil lawsuit defendants. 18l According to the
court in New York Times, the Playboy court was mistaken. The
question "need not have been asked. In civil cases where the
newsgatherer is not a party, the privilege is absolute."182

For the appellate court in New York Times, the lower
court's inquiry as to what use the photos were to be put was also
inappropriate. 18s "Whether the photos are bound for oblivion in
156. See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 690 P. 2d
625 (1984).
157. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 509, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429 The court
noted Volkswagen's contention that only a qualified privilege existed and cited Mitchell
for support: "What this argument overlooks is that the newsgatherers in Mitchell who
were seeking to resist the order for discovery were parties to the lawsuit. Our Supreme
Court pointed out that compelled disclosure might be appropriate in those cases in
which [newspersons] are parties." [d.
158. 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984) (libel action arising out of an
interview by Playboy with the comedy team Cheech and Chong, in which Cheech and
Chong made disparaging remarks about their former manager and his handling of their
financial affairs).
159. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 509, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
160. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 509 n.2, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 429 n.2: "The
Playboy court ruled that all information acquired by a nonparty witness in the course of
news gathering [came] within the protection of California's newsgathering shield law."
With respect to the rights of the criminally accused, the court also quoted Playboy's
finding that "[i]n cases involving a conflict between the criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial and a newsperson's protection under the First Amendment and
section 1070, the criminal defendant's constitutionally derived protection has resulted in
the rule that 'where the criminal defendant has demonstrated a reasonable possibility
that evidence sought ... might result in his exoneration, he is entitled to its discovery.' "
(citing Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 24-25, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 215).
161. New York Times, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 509, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
162. [d. (the court wryly noted, "the term 'Playboy Court' does not reflect our view
of the court, but only refers to the case decided by the court, id. at 509 n.3, 248 Cal.
Rptr. at 430 n.3).
163. [d.
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a wastebasket or have some special significance to the NewsPress is not important. The newsgatherer on the beat does not
have to worry about potential use of his or her material in third
party actions."18. Reiterating its position, the court stated that
"the shield law is to be broadly applied. Its provisions afford absolute protection to nonparty journalists in civil litigation."1811
The court then concluded that a privilege of nondisclosure
exists for newsgatherers. 188 Moreover, for nonparty newsgatherers, the privilege is absolute. 187 Unfortunately, the court did not
elaborate as to how its holding was to be found consistent with
the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary's comment that the
shield provides an immunity, not a privilege, except its declaration that "they are the same thing."188
New York Times is logically sound and simply stated. If, as
is the case with all nonparty witnesses, contempt is the only
sanction available, and contempt is prohibited by the statute, a
privilege in substance, if not in form, must exist. The fact that it
is labeled an immunity and not a privilege does not escape this
conclusion. Naturally, if the wording of the statute was amended
to reflect the existence of at least a qualified privilege, the courts
would have less difficulty in interpreting the shield law uniformly. At a minimum, the courts will have an easier time with
the shield law if the "immunity, not privilege" comment is
excised. 189
New York Times articulates the idea that shield law cases
should not be evaluated in terms of the content of the material
for which protection is sought. It should be noted that the Hallissy court applied this principle to the situation where disclosure was urged on the basis of who the source was. Finally, the
exact scope of protection for "unpublished material" should be
clarified. Until it is made clear that under the express terms of
the shield there is no difference between unpublished material
164. Id. at 510, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070, Comment, Assembly Committee on the Judiciary
(West Supp. 1988).
169. Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss2/4

26

Rousso: Evidence

'1989]

EVIDENCE

373

and material which leads to sources, cases will remain inconsistent and "exceptions" will continue to be carved out.

C.

AN EXAMPLE OF AN "EXCEPTION."

Another recent appellate case, Delaney v. Superior Court,170
held that in the "narrow situation" of a newsgatherer as an
"eyewitness to a public event," the shield law does not apply.l7l
In Delaney, a reporter and a photographer for the Los Angeles
Times accompanied members of the Long Beach Police Department on special patrol for complaints regarding drugs. 172 Two
men, observed on a bench in a mall, were questioned about an
apparent bag of narcotics sticking out of one of the men's
pocket.173 The officers testified that they asked defendant Delaney whether they could search his jacket for weapons and that
he consented. m Subsequently, a set of brass knuckles was found
and Delaney was arrested. l7Ci
Reporter Roxana Kopetman wrote an article about the incident which did not mention whether Delaney had consented to a
search. 178 Delaney moved to suppress the evidence of the brass
knuckles on the grounds that he had not consented to the
search. 177 He subpoenaed the reporter and the photographer to
testify about the search at the suppression hearing. 178 The newsgatherers moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that the
facts surrounding the arrest were "unpublished information"
under the shield law. 179 Their motion was denied. 180
At the suppression hearing, the reporters were called to testify on the issue of whether Delaney had consented to the search
of his jacket.181 Although they testified about the events leading
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

202 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 249 Cal. Rptr 60 (1988).
202 Cal. Ap. 3d 1019, 249 Cal. Rptr 60 (1988).
[d. at 1023, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 1024, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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up to the search, they refused to testify about whether Delaney
had consented to the search of the jacket. 182
The lower court held that the need for the reporters's testimony outweighed any claim based on the shield law. 18s The
lower court also found that the shield law "did not apply" because the reporters were "eyewitnesses."18. The reporters were
cited for contempt. 1811 The matter was appealed.
After discussing the history of the shield law, the appellate
court noted that the issue of whether an immunity existed when
the reporter witnesses a public event was "an issue of first impression."18S The court stated that its independent examination
of the Evidence Code and the constitution "[confirmed] that the
purpose of adding provisions regarding unpublished information
was to strengthen the protection of sources."187 The court distinguished Hammarley on the tenuous grounds that the Hammarley court had not determined whether "eyewitness observations of a public event constitute 'unpublished information'
under the shield law."188
This analysis is flawed in two respects. First, the so-called
182. [d.
183. The municipal court found that there was a need for the reporters' "neutral
testimony on the consent issue." [d. The appellate court offered no opinion as to the
basis of the finding of the lower court that the reporters were indeed "neutral."
184. [d.
185. Delaney, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1024, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 62. The superior court
granted a writ of habeus corpus, finding that the shield law provided immunity from
contempt. Delaney sought to vacate the order of the superior court; the appellate court
issued an alternative writ and reinstated the contempt citation. [d.
186. [d. at 1026, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
187. [d. The court noted that because no confidential sources were involved, "if the
shield law is applicable, it must be based on its provisions involving unpublished information." In support of its analysis, the court cited an analysis prepared for a 1974
amendment (SB 1858) which stated that the protection of unpublished information was
necessary "in order to keep open the sources of that information." [d. at 1027, 249 Cal.
Rptr. at 65. The court also quoted the argument which appeared on the ballot in favor of
the amendment in 1980, emphasizing the passages dealing with the protection of news
sources. [d.
188. [d. at 1029, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 66 (citing Hammarley, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388 at 396398, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 at 612-614) (court noted that in Hammarley, unpublished information "had broad reference" to material within the reporter's knowledge, "whether contained in source material or in memory"). The court found that neither Hammarley nor
Playboy had "attempted to determine whether eyewitness observations of a public event
constitute 'unpublished information' under the shield law." [d.
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"eyewitness exception" could arguably be applied to every incident that a reporter observes. Ostensibly everything that a reporter observes and reports on happens in public. Thus, although the court called its exception "narrow," the actual
possibilities for application are endless.
Second, the court failed to explain how its holding could
possibly be construed as consistent with Hammarley when that
case clearly found "unpublished information. . .contained in
source material or in memory"189 to be protected under the
shield law. The court in Delaney, apparently assuming that the
only issue was the citizen's duty to testify, did not address the
issue of whether the defendant had met the burden which would
justify the overcoming of the privilege. In other words, the Delaney court did not address the issue of whether the defendant
had shown that without the testimony of the reporters that he
would be denied his right to a fair trial. The opinion also did not
discuss the issue that the cost of protecting a free press may be
the occasional loss of relevant evidence at trial.
Instead, the majority in Delaney relied on the fact that "the
subject matter of the testimony is not dependant upon anyone's
trust being placed in the newsperson."190 This meant that there
was "no reason to differentiate the newsperson's observation
from that of any other citizen. m91 The court flatly asserted, "in
short, the testimony is wholly unrelated to the shield law."192
This is a remarkable pronouncement, for arguably any time a
reporter is called to testify about an event that he or she has
reported on, the shield law will be at issue.
The Delaney majority also dismissed the argument that the
elevation of the shield law into the state constitution broadened
the scope of its protection, finding that the elevation of the
shield law into the constitution was primarily for the purpose of
189. Id. In creating its eyewitness exception, the court neglected to mention that
neither Hammarley nor Playboy discussed the issue of "eyewitnesses" because they were
both founded on libel actions. The opinion offers little else in the way of analysis as
support for its facile "eyewitness" distinction.
190. Id. at 1029, 249 Cal. Rptr at 66.
191. Id. The court did not discuss the likelihood of the average citizen's being invited along on a police operation, and offered nothing else in support of its contention
that news reporters were no different from other citizens.
192. Id.
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abrogating the holdings in Farr and Rosato.1 93 The court neglected, however, to support this contention with solid evidence
or reasoning. While it may be true that the holdings in Farr and
Rosato provided the impetus for the constitutional amendment,
it is more likely that the amendment was proposed in order to
protect against judicial inroads on freedom of the press-inroads
similar to those created by the court in Delaney.19.
The majority's misunderstanding of the shield law is highlighted by the consideration that the same result might have
been reached had they used the Hammarley/Hallissy factors.
This was pointed out in the dissent. 1911 There was no reason for
creating an "exception" and no rationale for the finding that the
shield law was not at issue.
The dissent pointed out that using the Hammarley/Hallissy
factors would have served both important interests at stake: the
protection of the shield law and the criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to a fair trial,l98 Using this analysis, Delaney
could have shown that the information was relevant and necessary to his case; that it was not available from a source less intrusive on the privilege and that it might reasonably have led to
his exoneration. The court could then have avoided entirely its
analysis of the "purpose" of the shield law and focused on
whether the defendant had met the requisite burden for overcoming a privilege.
As noted by the dissent, the trial court could have held an
in camera hearing "to examine the evidence and balance the
competing interests.... "197 Instead, the majority's "narrow exception" focused on the result. This "exception" actually has so
broad a spectrum of application as to render it meaningless.
193. Delaney, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 1029, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
194. The court characterized its holding as strictly limited when in fact, its possibilities for application are endless.
195. The dissent pointed out that defendant "may discover evidence protected by
the shield laws where he demonstrates a reasonable possibility that the evidence might
result in his exoneration.... Even with the broad protection offered by the shield law,
the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment constitutional right to a fair trial is still protected and of paramount importance."ld. at 1032 (emphasis in origina\).
196. Id. The dissent found that the express language of the shield laws protected
newsgatherers from having to disclose any unpublished information obtained in the
course of newsgathering.
197. Id.
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Were newsgatherers compelled to testify about every event observed in public they would undoubtedly find themselves in
courtrooms more often than newsrooms.
CONCLUSION
California's courts must achieve a degree of uniformity in
their interpretation of the shield law. The California Supreme
Court has a unique opportunity to clarify the state of the law
with respect to the conflicting views held by the appellate courts
in New York Times and Delaney. There also is an opportunity
to resolve the conflict regarding the exact scope of protection afforded by the shield.
These issues need resolution. First, is there a difference between the terms "privilege" and "immunity," and what, if any,
is the effect of the difference? Second, what is the exact scope of
protection for unpublished information which does not lead to a
source? Next, in evaluating cases involving the newsgatherers'
shield, may the courts utilize more than one test? Finally, what
are the appropriate tests to be employed? The result in Delaney
could arguably have been reached by using the Hammerley/Hallissy/New York Times analyses. The better policy is to evaluate
whether the party seeking disclosure has met the burden which
would justify overcoming the privilege. The following is
recommended:
1. In evaluating cases involving the shield law, the first in-

quiry should be whether the newsperson is a party to the action.
Generally, where the newsgatherer is a party the action will be
one for defamation. The Mitchell factors are well suited to evaluating claims based on the shield law in such cases. However,
clarification is necessary with respect to the issue of sanctions
against nonparty newsgatherers. The fact that parties to an action may be subject to sanctions other than contempt should not
be used as a basis for finding that nonparties may be found in
contempt.
2. If the reporter is not a party, the analysis should then
focus on the type of action involved, civil or criminal. With respect to criminal actions, the Hammarley/Hallissy analysis is
ideal. Emphasis should be placed on the party seeking disclosure
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and whether that party can show that the withheld information
is relevant to his case, not available from a source less intrusive
on the privilege, and reasonably likely to lead to his exoneration.
3. For nonparty newsgatherers in civil actions, the analysis
of the court in New York Times is preferable. The policy of
maintaining the free flow of information to the public should not
be twisted out of proportion. The newsgatherer's obligation is to
the public; to keep the public informed. The value of subsidizing
civil litigants' claims by utilizing newsgatherers as discovery resources does little to benefit the general public. In fact, compelling newsgatherers to aid civil litigants in their cases may keep
them from fully performing their duty of maintaining the free
flow of information.
4. The Legislature should excise the Assembly Committee
on the Judiciary's comment following section 1070 which states
that the shield provides an immunity and not a privilege. The
comment has only served as a source of confusion. Since it is not
part of the actual text of the statute it is of questionable legal
significance.
The above suggestions would provide the courts with a definite guide to aid them in deciding newsgatherer's shield cases.
Hopefully, this would lead to more consistent and predictable
outcomes. In addition, a classification as outlined above is well
suited to balancing and protecting all of the important rights at
stake. It places equal value on the right of the public to be informed and the press' duty to inform the public. This viewpoint
also respects the right of all litigants, civil and criminal, to obtain evidence relevant and necessary to the full and fair litigation of a case.
Nora Linda Rousso *

• Golden Gate University School of Law, class of 1990.
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